Ministers have roundly trashed the Charter of Democracy, highlighting the alleged corruption of its authors and contemptuously dismissing its contents. Its supporters consider it a historic document, no less significant than a new "Objectives Resolution" which will change history. The common man is skeptical, trusting neither the government nor its critics. The document itself is not bad (except for poor drafting, a shame considering the talent which helped frame it). Most people support the need for a sovereign parliament, fair elections, a clean judiciary, just accountability and generally strengthened institutions. But they do not think it will work as promises are seldom implemented. However, the real significance of the Charter is not in its content but in the mere fact that it has been signed.

The Charter has effectively changed the political scenario of the country and put the government in an untenable position. During the last 50-odd years the establishment has always governed the country by securing the support of either one of the two major political parties of the country, particularly during elections. To remove Ms. Bhutto it supported Mr. Sharif. To remove Mr. Sharif, it reversed itself and supported Ms. Bhutto. To remove her again, it reversed itself once more and supported the earlier discredited Mr. Sharif. That is because each of them always had the support of 30 percent or more of the population. By winning the support of either one, all it required was some rigging here, some coercion there; some bribing here, some fixing there; and the magic figure of credible parliamentary majorities was easily achieved. Without such support the next elections cannot be won, even with massive ragging.

It is therefore not surprising that during the last year or so the government has tried to bring one party or the other on board. Mr. Zardari was released. Mr. Sharif was permitted to leave Saudi Arabia. Emissaries shuttled secretly back and forth to Dubai and London. Islamabad was rife with rumours of an imminent deal. But all the overtures failed. The Charter has now effectively ruled out a separate deal with either of the two parties. Elections in 2007 now appear less likely, simply because no military government will ever hold an election its "boys" are sure to lose. Already the President is talking about being re-elected by the present Parliament. Others say that once the assemblies end their term in October 2007 a caretaker government will be formed to hold elections, some time in 2008. PML (Q) leaders have an even more novel solution: like bureaucrats and soldiers, parliamentarians should also get an extension. Petrified as they are of facing the electorate, they would overwhelmingly vote a Constitutional amendment to extend their own tenure by a couple of years. The government's legal eagles will no doubt come up with even more bizarre solutions suited to "the genius of our people". But they will be mere fig leaves for a non-democratic order.

All is not lost, however. Whenever elections are held, it will be under the Constitution. Simply because of the Charter, the President will not remove the 17th Amendment, under which both Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif are ineligible to be Prime Minister. All they have to do is publicly state the obvious --- that they are not candidates for Prime Minister. (They still remain powerful party Rahbars, a-la Sonia Gandhi and Altaf Hussain.). The President can then feel comfortable in holding genuinely free and fair elections, well before 2007, under a caretaker government, with no fear of either of the two becoming Prime Minister. For the first time in the country's history a truly representative parliament can meet and elect a new leadership and can accept or reject all or part of the Charter.

The President will also retain some critical powers under the 17th Amendment for a year or so, till October 2007. He will have to work with the independent Parliament, somewhat like a strong French President working in harmony with an opposition Prime Minister. Or the present federal government working with the opposition in two provinces, by and large quite smoothly. The President, despite Kargil, has shown flexibility by opening a dialogue with his number one enemy of four decades, India. He can show similar flexibility with his own people and make the transition work. When his tenure ends, a grateful nation will surely re-elect him, with or without the 17th Amendment. Even if it does not, the President can ride into the sunset with honour and dignity, something no leader in Pakistan's history has ever achieved, all having been booted out in disgrace or executated or assassinated. That indeed would be his crowning achievement.

The alternatives are chaotic. With the situation deteriorating in Baluchistan and FATA; increased Taliban activity in Afghanistan; severe criticism of Pakistan by the Karzai government and its American and British theatre commanders; dwindling international support on issues like the AQ Khan scandal, human rights violations etc; a severe split in the crucial Sind coalition; the "forward-blocking" of the ruling party; and a restless public beginning to stir; the President may well declare an emergency. That will put paid to elections indefinitely, with grave repercussions at home and abroad.

On the other hand the united opposition may be able to capitalize on the restlessness of the public, already straining under the weight of soaring prices and totally disillusioned with broken promises of good governance. Once the mobs come out on the street, no one will be able to control the violence. It will pit soldiers against civilians in towns like Lahore, with consequences too horrific to contemplate.

The Charter of Democracy has brought matters to a head. Leaders must swiftly review the situation and take wise decisions to restore democracy. Without democracy in Pakistan, the country will end up in flames, not only burning itself but further destabilizing an already inflamed region.