Everything has suddenly become very complex. Dams
have once again become a matter of life and death.
It was not so six months back, nor a year back, nor
even five. But vaguely I remember ten years back,
and also twenty years back, the need for a dam at
Kalabagh was just as suddenly a matter of life and
death. After months of violent political disagreements,
technical experts pontificating on merits and de-merits
of each location and vested interests throwing in
their prejudiced views, the hotly debated issue would
die a quiet death, only to be resurrected some years
later to tear the nation apart once more.
In the last few weeks, after years of hibernation,
Kalabagh is alive again, generating serious discord
in the land. Why now is not all that clear, but the
die is cast. President Musharraf has declared two
basic principles: A dam must be built at Kalabagh;
and there must be a consensus. But there is no consensus
today. Provincial Assemblies of Sind, Frontier and
Baluchistan have repeatedly rejected the dam. More
recently the vast majority of leaders of Sind and
the Frontier have reaffirmed their categorical opposition.
A consensus is not likely to emerge in the near future,
no matter how strenuously the President lobbies for
it. Of course a consensus is possible. But it will
take a great deal of time, perhaps years, to achieve.
It will also require sustained and steady lobbying
over a long period of time, not the random once-a-decade
bulldozing we have seen since the dam was first thought
of. Nor unhelpful remarks of ministers who can only
conceive of a consensus by threatening skeptical colleagues
that if they don't come on board, they are dispensable.
In their arrogance they do not understand that neither
is consensus arrived at through strong-arm tactics
nor are certain colleagues easily replaced. Particularly
in the present political dispensation, with all its
inherent weaknesses. Perhaps a totally new political
alignment may well be the answer. After all, if indeed
it is a matter of life and death, sacrificing the
present very weak coalition for a more robust and
credible one is a small price to pay. But that again
will take time.
So where do we go from here? The President is firm
on the need for enhancing water storage. He is publicly
committed to building Kalabagh. And just as publicly
committed to that very elusive consensus. The answer
may well lie elsewhere. While continuing to work towards
building a consensus on Kalabagh, without abandoning
it, he may offer viable alternatives which overcome
the two main objections of the dam's opponents—no
dam on the Indus River and no flooding or waterlogging
or population displacement in the Frontier. Some in
government are convinced that all that can be achieved
by building a reservoir at Akhoori.
Akhoori is one of several interesting alternatives.
It is not only not on the Indus; it is not on any
river. It is not in the Frontier but in the Punjab.
It is in a sparsely populated area where dislocation
of residents would be minimal. Akhoori is a depression
on a relatively small Nulla about 30 miles North West
of Islamabad. A low barrage can be built across the
Nulla, creating a substantial storage area over a
generally barren landscape. Although many of the objections
of skeptics would have been overcome there surely
will still be several genuine concerns which will
need to be resolved. That leads to the next problem.
Where would the water come from? And how does one
get the water there, in the absence of a river? Not
surprisingly a great deal of work has already been
done to solve these problems. In fact that ultimate
in bureaucratic jargon—a PC 1 for building the
Akhoori storage---has already been made several years
back. The PC 1 visualizes a canal from Tarbela to
Akhoori, which would carry only the excess flood water
from Tarbela (water which would otherwise be lost);
store it safely at Akhoori and drop it back into the
Indus when the river is dry.
The present deadlock over which dam should be built
and when may well be solved by a three-pronged approach.
Firstly, continue working towards a consensus and
definitely build Kalabagh, but only when consensus
is reached, thereby strengthening both inter-provincial
harmony and democracy. Secondly, start work immediately
on Bhasha, or any other dam upstream of Kalabagh where
there is little opposition, although it will take
a dozen years or more to build. And to fill the gap
pending Kalabagh coming on stream, Akhoori can meet
part of the water storage needs of the country. Surprisingly,
with everyone concentrating on Kalabagh the simplest,
least expensive and least controversial solutions
are being totally ignored. Tarbela and Mangla are
silting up and their capacity is reducing every year.
A part of the problem has already been solved by raising
Mangla and increasing its capacity. But how to stop
future silting of both Mangla and Tarbela and how
to remove their accumulated silt are problems which
need an innovate approach. Silting can easily be avoided
by installing sluicing gates during construction.
Sluicing permits sediment to flow out of the dam along
with water. Unfortunately these simple systems were
not installed at Mangla and Tarbela when the dams
were built. But they can be installed even now, thereby
stopping the current silting, which is causing reduction
in the capacity of the dams every year and which is
why more storage is needed in the first place. The
technology is there and the cost is not prohibitive.
As for the sediment which has accumulated in the
dams already, that can be removed by dredging. Modern
dredging in a lake is relatively simple and inexpensive,
certainly far cheaper than building replacement dams.
All across the globe dredging is done all the time.
Ports are being deepend to cater for giant new container
ships and tankers, as in Karachi. Dredging creates
new ports like Gwadar. And dredging (with landfill)
enables building of new islands as in Dubai, airports
as in Japan and housing complexes as in Defence Karachi.
Many ports like New York have solid rock beneath the
surface which has to be dynamited and lifted out,
which is expensive. But Tarbela and Mangla have partially
loose rock and mainly sediment which is very easily
and cheaply removed. Such sediment can be used to
fill gullies and ditches, creating new alluvial soil,
which can become excellent farmland where only barren
terrain exists. The capital costs of dredging are
minimal, involving only simple dumb barges with pumps
and pipes, while running costs are primarily the cost
of electricity to run the pumps. That is all. The
storage capacity of the two dams can thus increase
by almost the same amount as the total capacity of
Kalabagh dam.
Why these two simple alternatives are not even being
discussed today remains a mystery, as no one will
be adversely effected, in Sind, the Frontier or Baluchistan
while much of the storage problem will be resolved
peacefully. Whether the President pushes ahead with
Kalabagh without a consensus or goes for any of the
several less divisive and cheaper options will have
grave, long-term consequences, not only for the country's
agriculture but also on its integrity. In the charged
environment of today we must not take any decision
without examining every option
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